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 Statutory interpretation has gone empirical in a big, big way.  Earlier 
this year, the second in the mammoth Gluck–Bressman studies on statutory 
drafting was published by the Stanford Law Review.
1
  Now we have the 
equally mammoth Eskridge–Christiansen overrides study in the Texas Law 
Review.
2
  Whether or not one agrees with these studies’ findings, the very 
idea of supplementing the standard statutory interpretation debates with 
something more than “big theory” is a delightful move in a pragmatic 
direction.  Rather than debating “law as integrity”3 or even “textualism,”4 
these authors have jumped in the trenches, labored mightily, and tried to 
unearth the facts of the matter.  As Jerry Mashaw once wrote, without a 
positive theory of lawmaking institutions, all our normative claims may be 
fairy tales.
5
  One might as well throw all manner of brilliant theories in the 
trash, if their factual assumptions are wrong. 
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 In 2012, the New York Times reported that congressional overrides of 
judicial decisions had withered to almost nothing in the midst of hyper-
partisan crisis.
6
  This claim was based on a study by law professor and 
political scientist Richard Hasen.
7
  Professor Eskridge, who had written an 
earlier study showing far more override activity,
8
 questioned the findings.  
With Christiansen, he embarked on the most ambitious study of overrides 
ever undertaken.  Not only is this study far more comprehensive than any of 
the others—spanning 275 decisions and 44 years—it uses significantly 
improved methodology (see below).
9
  Because of this methodological 
advance, it should now be considered the definitive study, the best effort so 
far to obtain a universe (rather than a sample) of congressional overrides of 
Supreme Court decisions. 
 What does the study tell us?  There are a number of significant findings, 
but the following stand out.  First, overrides of Supreme Court decisions are 
not the rare birds one might imagine and some positive theory has 
predicted;
10
 they are, however, declining in numbers.
11
  The 1990s was the 
golden age of overrides, in part because of two super-overrides, the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991 and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 
1996, which struck down multiple Supreme Court decisions.  Second, 
overrides are bipartisan, occurring during periods of divided government and 
high partisanship.  The super-overrides are a good example: the Civil Rights 
Act of 1991 moved in the liberal direction,
12
 the Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act of 1996 in the conservative direction.
13
  Third, Congress 
 
6. Adam Liptak, In Congress’s Paralysis, a Mightier Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 
2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/21/us/politics/supreme-court-gains-power-from-paralysis-
of-congress.html?_r=0 (quoting Professor Richard L. Hasen). 
7. Id. 
8. William N. Eskridge Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 
YALE L.J. 331 (1991). 
9. Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 2, at 1329. 
10. See id. at 1458 (stating that the 1990s was the “golden age” for overrides).  For example, 
some positive theory suggests that there should be no overrides because, as a strategic actor, the 
Court will manipulate its doctrine to avoid override.  Pablo T. Spiller & Emerson H. Tiller, 
Invitations to Override: Congressional Reversals of Supreme Court Decisions, 16 INT’L REV. L. & 
ECON. 503, 505 (1996). 
11. There is some dispute about why we have seen this decline; Hasen has argued hyper-
partisanship, Eskridge and Christensen posit a shift in subject matter area—Congress is focused on 
matters that are not the bread and butter of judicial interpretation. Eskridge & Christiansen, supra 
note 2, at 1347–53. Another interpretation for which I have only anecdotal evidence is simply that, 
after 2000, members were elected to the Senate to “destroy the institution” (the words of a staffer in 
my 2000 study of judiciary committee staffers). See Victoria Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The 
Politics of Legislative Drafting: A Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 605–10 
(2002). There is a difference between large policy differences on a party scale and members who 
use individual prerogatives to block any action. 
12. See Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 2, at 1319–20 (providing “examples of broad 
bipartisan laws that ambitiously reset statutory policies, and in the process, override bushels of 
Supreme Court opinions”). 
13. Id. 
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does not override because of statutory method (e.g. textualism or 
purposivism).  The only exception to that rule is the finding that decisions  
based on the “whole code” doctrine—which presumes Congress uses words 




 Overrides should be of interest to a far larger group of scholars than 
statutory interpretation enthusiasts.  We have, in overrides, open interbranch 
encounters between Congress and the Courts far more typically found in the 
shadows of everyday Washington politics.  Interestingly, Christiansen and 
Eskridge posit the court-congress relationship as more triadic than dyadic 
given the role played by agencies.  One of their more interesting conclusions 
is that agencie are the big winners in the override game: agencies were 
present in seventy percent of the override cases and the agency view 
prevailed with Congress and against the Supreme Court in three-quarters of 
those overrides.
15
 When the Supreme Court rejects the statutory 
interpretations of agencies, supported by the Solicitor General, it does so at 
its peril.  This suggests that the common wisdom—that agencies often have 
a better handle than courts on Congress’s meaning because of their closer 
connections with Congress (through oversight, expertise about the statute, 
informal communications, etc.)—is true.  It also suggests that broad 
congressional delegation to agencies—traditionally viewed with suspicion by 
lawyers—may come with a silver interpretive lining. 
 In this response, I make no attempt to survey the richness of this 
gargantuan study nor the extraordinary effort it must have taken.  It should 
be of interest to readers of court–congress interaction, students of agency 
action, scholars of statutory interpretation, and the separation of powers.  
My aim is not to repeat the study, or even to summarize it, but to provide a 
parsimonious and helpful lens through which we may understand its 
intellectual assumptions and accomplishments.  In Part I, I address its 
methodological virtues and vices.  In Part II, I posit a fairly parsimonious 
model that helps to explain the rich Christiansen and Eskridge findings.  In 
Part III, I provide a brief comment on the authors’ recommendations for 
future action. 
I. The Method: Virtues and Vices 
 Every empirical study comes with implicit intellectual assumptions.  
This is nowhere more true than in the empirical methods used to collect data.  
Christiansen and Eskridge have done something very important on the 
methodological side that may go unnoticed by the average reader: it may 
sound basic, but counting overrides is actually very difficult and needs to be 
 
14. See id. at 1405–08 (finding that “[w]here the Court relies significantly on the statutory 
scheme, or various whole act or whole code canons, it is much more likely to be overridden”). 
15. Id. at 1321. 
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responsive to how Congress actually legislates.
16
  At the same time, the 
Christiansen and Eskridge findings, like most other studies in this area, are 
necessarily limited by their focus—Supreme Court decisions.  This raises 
some questions about whether their findings reflect the larger field of all 
federal statutory interpretation decisions, even if they provide some 
cautionary lessons for federal courts. 
A. Virtues: Understanding the Basics About Congress 
 Today, law schools teach a kind of civic illiteracy; they are full of 
courses on the minutiae of civil and administrative procedure, but none on 
the very basic congressional procedures by which law is made.  The 
common law, all but dead to members of the Supreme Court, is nevertheless 
alive and well in law schools.  By contrast, the vast lawmaking institutions 
of our democracy—Congress and the Executive Branch—are studied through 
the “rear view” mirror, through cases rather than from the “inside.”  
Empiricism, for all of its potential problems, is a necessary step forward in 
the battle to remedy this radical gap in law school education.  One cannot 
study Congress, or its actions (such as overrides), without some basic 
understanding of how Congress operates. 
 Prior studies in this area, including Eskridge’s own (as he admits),17 
were based on rudimentary, and faulty, assumptions about Congress.  
Following the ancient, now outmoded Wilsonian wisdom that all things in 
Congress happen in committee,
18
 prior studies (even ones done by political 
scientists) were based on identifying overrides by looking at committee 
reports.  This will systematically undercount overrides since, in the past 30 
years, bills increasingly bypass committee.  What Barbara Sinclair once 
called “unorthodox lawmaking,” has become “orthodox.”19  As Gluck and 
Bressman show in their study of the recent Congress many bills simply 
bypass committee today.
20
  Rectifying that here, Christiansen and Eskridge 
realize that if they are to “find” statutory overrides, they cannot rely, as did 
the original study, on committee reports to provide them with such 
information.  Instead, they engage in a heroic effort to wade through 
debates, hearings, and a variety of other congressional sources to locate 
 
16. Id. at 1331. 
17. Id. at 1326–28; cf.  Richard L. Hasen, End of the Dialogue? Political Polarization, The 
Supreme Court, and Congress, 86 S. CALIF. L. REV. 205, 214–24 (2013) (using the committee 
report methodology). 
18. THOMAS WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT: A STUDY IN AMERICAN 
POLITICS 79 (1885) (“Congress in session is Congress on public exhibition, whilst Congress in its 
committee-rooms is Congress at work.”). 
19. Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 1, at 918, 936, 979, 1022 (explaining “how the 
‘textbook’ legislative process no longer exists”). 
20. Gluck & Bressman, Part II, supra note 1, at 756–57 (describing how leadership 
involvement in statutory drafting allows legislators to remove statutes from the committee process). 
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overrides.  To the extent earlier studies have not used this methodology, they 
have been superseded by Christiansen and Eskridge. 
B. Vices: All Interpretive Overrides? 
 Having hurdled one rather important methodological barrier does not 
mean, however, that the study solves all methodological problems.  What 
can we really know, many will say, from a study focusing on that oh-so-
atypical body, the Supreme Court?  Christiansen and Eskridge’s universe 
does not include Congress’s track record of overriding lower court decisions.  
Such overrides do happen.  There are celebrated anecdotal examples of 
appellate cases that the Congress has chosen to override as fast as you can 
call the roll: notice how quickly Congress overrode a decision from a federal 
court of appeals branding plea bargaining a bribe!
21
  Thus, we do not know 
from this study the proportion of all statutory interpretation cases, decided 
by the Supreme Court and the federal courts, which are overridden.  If we 
expand the denominator, increasing the number of cases from the fraction 
heard by the Supreme Court to all federal cases, the incidence of overrides is 
likely to drop dramatically. 
 Christiansen and Eskridge might respond as follows: we recognize that 
we have studied the universe of Supreme Court cases, but our findings are 
generalizable as a sample of all federal court decisions.  The problem here is 
that Supreme Court decisions are unlikely to be a representative sample; they 
differ from standard appellate decisions along a number of dimensions.  
First, Supreme Court decisions are skewed toward the politically imperative 
because the Court chooses its decisions; appellate courts do not have the 
certiorari discretion accorded to the Supreme Court.  Second, Supreme 
Court decisions are also visible to the public—and voters—in a way that 
appellate decisions generally are not.  How is Congress to override a 
decision that it does not know about?  There are significant barriers to 
communication between courts and Congress, as Judge Katzmann has 
explained.
22
  These factors will systematically skew the number of Supreme 
Court overrides relative to lower court overrides.  Bottom line: one 
generalizes from the Supreme Court to lower court behavior, and 
Congressional response to that behavior, at one’s peril. 
 This scope question provides an important caution about how judges and 
lawyers should read the Christiansen and Eskridge study.  In my first year 
classes, it is often queried by students, “well, can’t Congress just change the 
law if the court makes a bad statutory interpretation decision?”  So, too, 
judges are increasingly, according to Eskridge and Christenson, signaling to 
Congress that it should override its statutory decisions if they are wrong.  
 
21. United States v. Singleton, 144 F.3d 1343, 1343 (10th Cir. 1998), vacated, 165 F.3d 1297  
(10th Cir. 1999) (en banc). 
22. Robert A. Katzmann, Madison Lecture: Statutes, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 637, 666 (2012). 
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Lawyers and judges should not confuse findings of overrides, or even a 
judicial call for an override, with the notion that Congress will in fact 
respond.  Any view that assumes it is easy to pass a statute is wildly 
uninformed about the difficulty of legislation.  It is a bit like comparing 
running up a hill with running up the Alps, or perhaps in a case of a super-
override, running up Everest.  Almost by definition (the numbers) one can 
predict that the average man-hours spent getting the agreement of 535 
members, representing a country of 300 million, far exceeds the effort for 
any Supreme Court decision that has ever been written (9 Justices plus 36 
clerks versus 535 members and 30,000 staff).  The courts are a tiny 
institution compared to Congress, and no one should forget that basic fact, 
else one commit the kind of legally solipsistic error of thinking that the earth 
(i.e. the judiciary) is the center of the universe. 
 Let us not diminish, however, what the Christiansen and Eskridge study 
does say to judges and courts.  After all, one of the most important roles of 
the Supreme Court is to provide guidance to lower courts.  Judges and 
lawyers should now be on notice—for the second time23—that some outlier 
interpretive methods are likely to yield results contrary to Congress’s aims.  
As they explain it, decisions are more likely to be overridden when they are 
based on “reliance on plain meaning of statutory text, especially when such 
reliance depends critically on whole act and whole code arguments or flies in 
the face of strong legislative history.”24  To those of us who study Congress, 
there is little surprise in this conclusion; after all, empirical studies on 
Congress tend to suggest that the “whole code” rule is wildly unrealistic25 
and that Congress cannot act without the use of what lawyers call “legislative 
history”—ergo that Congress uses reports and debate to coordinate meaning.  
Lower courts, as well as the Supreme Court, should now know that, if their 
aim is to avoid override, it is wise to confirm their “plain” meanings by 
reference to actual congressional context—as opposed to hypothesized 
“whole code” rule or mere assertions that text is “plain.” 
II. Congressional Overrides from the Inside 
 Every empirical study makes intellectual commitments and this one is no 
different.  Overrides require at least two institutions and focusing on the 
Supreme Court causes one to ask questions one might not ask, as we will see, 
if one focused on Congress from the inside.  Christiansen and Eskridge use 
what I would call a legal methodology, one which aims to discover why 
Congress overruled the Supreme Court through the common law method—
for example, looking at the subject matters and interpretive methods used in 
particular Supreme Court opinions.  In compiling this information, 
 
23. See Eskridge, supra note 7, at 335–36. 
24. Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 2, at 1321. 
25. See Gluck & Bressman, Part I, at 933–39; Gluck & Bressman, Part II, at 760–761; Nourse 
& Schacter, supra note 10. 
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Christensen and Eskridge have expended extraordinary effort, providing 
lengthy and detailed accounts of particular subject matter areas and 
individual overrides and compiling legislative histories of enormous 
complexity.  The effort is almost mind-boggling when one imagines the 
review not only of the Supreme Court’s cases, the overriding bills, and the 
debates of about 286 bills.
26
  Consistent with this approach, Christiansen and 
Eskridge argue that there are some subject matter areas far more likely to 
yield overrides than others.  From this, they offer a long list of normative 
conclusions about court–congress–administration dialogue. 
 This normative approach leaves one wondering about a very basic 
question: why Congress ever overrides, given the press of business in 
Congress and seemingly ever-present hyperpartisanship.  Positive political 
theory suggests that overrides should be rare, if not nonexistent (as a strategic 
player, the Supreme Court will insulate its decisions from override).  That 
invites us to ask: What are Congress’s incentives for overriding?  And, if we 
consider those factors, is it possible to obtain a more parsimonious predictive 
tool?  Loosely borrowing from a very famous diagram offered by the 
political scientist James Q. Wilson to describe the likelihood of different 
kinds of legislation,
27
 I offer a diagrammatic hypothesis about overrides.  
The diagram below suggests that, from the congressional perspective, there 
are two major influences: first, whether the decision or the override passes 
the agenda threshold—meaning that Congress is paying attention; 28  the 




















 I posit that if the issue does not pass the agenda threshold then there is no 
significant likelihood of an override.  Issues for which there is no call for 
change—whether from a mass public or an interest group—will not motivate 
 
26. See Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 2, at 1330 (describing the methodology employed 
by Christiansen & Eskridge). 
27. JAMES Q. WILSON, POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS (1973). 
28. DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 36–62 (2004); see also 
Victoria Nourse, Misunderstanding Congress: Statutory Interpretation, the Supermajoritarian 
Difficulty, and the Separation of Powers, 99 GEO. L.J. 1119, 1153–62 (2011). 
29. I don’t mean that the parties have to agree at a general level, but that at the particular level 
of the override they have to obtain at least 60 votes to surmount the filibuster barrier in the Senate, 
which typically involves moving some votes across party lines.  See KEITH KREHBIEL, PIVOTAL 
POLITICS: A THEORY OF U.S. LAWMAKING (1998). 
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legislative action.  Issues must cross a salience or agenda threshold, given 
that there is limited time for legislative action.  As Christiansen and 
Eskridge’s examples suggest, there may be many statutory interpretation 
decisions in need of override (in theory, those decisions could vastly 
outnumber the actual overrides by hundreds or even thousands of statutes), 
but if the judicial decisions do not catch anyone’s attention in Congress, and 
are not put on the agenda, there will be no override—even if there would be 
bipartisan support had it risen to the agenda.  An override can hurdle the 
agenda threshold in many ways, by individual action, interest group pressure, 
major public outcry, or crisis, but it has to hurdle that barrier to be 
considered. 
 Even if the potential override passes the agenda threshold, overrides 
must also cross a bipartisanship threshold.  Once the issue is on the agenda, 
the greater the bipartisan support for override, the greater the chance for 
actual override legislation.  Bipartisanship of some degree is necessary to 
hurdle the filibuster barrier in the Senate (60 votes) and may be necessary to 
bridge party differences between the House and the Senate.  By contrast, if 
the Congress is hopelessly divided even on a high agenda issue (gun control 
or the death penalty) there is far less likelihood of override unless the 
bipartisanship threshold can be hurdled.  Based on this metric, I hypothesize 
the following: that high agenda and high bipartisanship are most likely to 
yield an override.  By contrast, low agenda (no one cares) and low 
bipartisanship (high internal conflict) are likely not to produce an override. 
 This model helps to explain a number of the Christiansen and Eskridge 
findings.  First, it explains their principal finding about the types of 
overrides.  Christiansen and Eskridge conclude that “overrides are usually 
not the contentious process that characterized the 1991 [Civil Rights Act] and 
other dramatic overrides of great interest to the media, law students, and 
many academics.”30  Two-thirds of the overrides were what Christiansen and 
Eskridge characterize as “policy updating,” where there is not a “great deal 
of negative judgment about the Court’s performance,” but the Congress 
considers its policy judgment, rather than the Supreme Court’s, more 
efficient or wise or popular.
31
  Another significant portion of overrides were 
“clarifying overrides,” even less important in policy terms, but “responding 
to confusion in the law” or “fine-tuning statutes in ways that have few policy 
consequences.”32 
 If this is correct, it supports the view that the vast majority of overrides 
are, just as Christiansen and Eskridge find, capable of bipartisan resolution 
without tremendous effort—they are not “dramatic,” there is no newsworthy 
court–congress battle.  Only 20 percent of the overrides in their sample dealt 
 
30. Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 2, at 1369. 
31. Id. at 1370. 
32. Id. at 1373. 
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with the kind of issues they dubbed contentious or dramatic.
33
  To spin this 
out a bit, consider the outlier case, where there is drama and the issue easily 
passes the agenda hurdle but is highly contentious and definitely not 
bipartisan.  Christiansen and Eskridge acknowledge that the Civil Rights Act 
(CRA) of 1991 is the prime example of a major court–congress battle about 
“restoring” the law to its prior position before Supreme Court 
interpretation.
34
  Anyone who knows even a smidgen about the legislative 
battle over the CRA of 1991 knows that it was contentious, took years to 
accomplish, and was the subject of major party battles.  It was only passed 
in the end by overriding the President, which means, by definition, that there 
is supermajoritarian support for the override.
35
 
 By contrast, the vast majority of overrides (the 80% defined by 
Christiansen and Eskridge as “policy-updating” and “clarifying”) 36  are 
precisely the kind of nondramatic, nonpublicly divisive issues susceptible to 
bipartisan compromise.  Consider the second area Christiansen and Eskridge 
find yielding a significant number of overrides: federal jurisdiction and civil 
procedure.  Like tax and bankruptcy, the third and fourth areas with a 
significant number of overrides respectively, one might think these subjects 
would not even hurdle the agenda barrier—the arcana of tax, jurisdiction, and 
bankruptcy are hardly dinner table conversation or the subject of voting 
placards (I “voted for him because of his position on civil procedure?!”).  
However, interest groups can propel an issue onto the agenda.  And, indeed, 
in the jurisdiction case, as Christiansen and Eskridge explain, it was the 
plaintiffs’ bar in one case and the business bar in another, that made an 
“issue” of these jurisdictional questions.37  Once over the agenda hurdle, the 
question was whether one could find a bipartisan solution.  As Christiansen 
and Eskridge explain, in the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, the 
plaintiffs’ bar managed to find support from President George H.W. Bush;38 
with the bipartisanship hurdle overcome, the override was accomplished.  
Put in other words, the kinds of issues this study found yielding overrides 
were not do or die political issues, but instead issues capable of bipartisan 
compromise once on the agenda. 
 This metric also helps to explain the “winners” Christiansen and 
Eskridge find in this process.  They conclude that the federal government 
 
33. Id. at 1369–75. 
34. Id. at 1374. 
35. See Roger Clegg, Introduction: A Brief Legislative History of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 
54 LA. L. REV. 1459, 1464–1469 (1994) (relating the process by which the 1991 Civil Rights Act 
was eventually signed into law, including an original veto and many subsequent re-negotiations); 
Donald R. Livingston, The Civil Rights Act of 1991 and EEOC Enforcement, 23 STETSON L. REV. 
53, 53 (1993) (characterizing the Civil Rights Act that President Bush signed into law as “hotly 
debated”). 
36. Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 2, at 1370–74. 
37. Id. at 1382. 
38. Id. 
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and, to a lesser extent, state and local governments are “big” winners in the 
override process.
39
  Again this should not be surprising from the perspective 
of the agenda–bipartisanship model.  Winners like the federal and state 
governments have significant clout to get items on the congressional 
agenda.
40
  Members of the federal government deal with members of 
Congress on a regular basis through letters, at cocktail parties, and more 
importantly at oversight hearings.  The Attorney General can easily send up 
a list of his favorite Supreme Court override candidates.  Members of the 
Senate and the House also typically have ties to local government officials—
both “ties of representation” (they are representing the same voters) and “ties 
of party” (they may have party affiliations).  Because of these ties, state and 
local politicians are also capable of hurdling the agenda threshold.  Finally, 
in one of the most striking findings, Christiansen and Eskridge conclude that 
agencies are the biggest winners.
41
  It should be no surprise that agencies 
can have, and have had, a strong interest in getting an issue on the 
congressional agenda, particularly when their views have effectively been 
“dissed” in the Supreme Court. 
 Finally, this metric explains the converse phenomenon: no override.  For 
example, it explains why Congress does not override particular methods of 
statutory interpretation.  No one ever lost an election by saying “I’m for 
purposivism.”  Methods of statutory interpretation are the arcana of a 
lawyerly elite and are unlikely to hurdle the agenda bar.  Although law 
professors repeatedly call on Congress to do something about interpretive 
regimes, the only way this will happen is if “interpretation” hurdles the 
agenda threshold, and there is no reason in votes or interest groups to suggest 
that is the case outside a particular controversy of public import.  That some 
state legislatures have enacted interpretive rules does not suggest to the 
contrary—no single state is the leader of the free world, with lots of other 
things to do than to adopt a “plain meaning” rule the courts have already 
adopted.  Less obviously, it also explains why statutes sorely in need of 
override, that affect millions of people, never yield a congressional response.  
Christiansen and Eskridge decry the failure to override decisions interpreting 
ERISA, a law affecting a pension network covering millions of citizens.
42
  
On both the agenda and bipartisanship scores, however, ERISA overrides are 
not likely.  Dispersed majorities often suffer without interest groups to bring 
their issues onto the agenda, and here, as Christiansen and Eskridge 
 
39. Id. at 1376. 
40. See George Tsebelis & Bjørn Erik Rasch, Government and Legislative Agenda Setting: An 
Introduction, in THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENTS IN LEGISLATIVE AGENDA SETTING 2, 5 (George 
Tsebelis & Bjørn Erik Rasch eds., 2011) (explaining legislative agenda setting as a function of 
“institutional” power, which are constitutional entitlements or procedural rules that allow 
governments to control what issues make it on the agenda, and describing the legislative process as 
a “scarce resource” that the government can control through its own agenda-setting). 
41. Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 2, at 1377–79. 
42. Id. at 1366–67. 
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themselves note, the relevant interest groups (unions and business) are locked 
in a combat unlikely to reach bipartisan solution. 
 To conclude, consider an example showing how an override can move 
from the unlikely category to the super-override category along the lines I 
have described.  Christiansen and Eskridge classify the habeas reform of 
1995 as a “super-override.”43  On the other hand, they argue that most of the 
law was in fact “policy-updating.”  Given that I was involved with this 
statute while working as a congressional staffer, I can report the following: In 
fact, there was substantial contention (and debate) about habeas in large part 
because Supreme Court Justices put habeas on the legislative agenda;
44
 but it 
went nowhere.  From 1991–1993, the Senate debated, and redebated, 
habeas, including items such as whether to overrule the Teague v. Lane 
habeas retroactivity rule (arcane to most lawyers, but highly important to 
death penalty litigators).
45
  Nothing happened, despite year after year of 
debate (the issue was first broached in bills introduced in the Reagan 
administration in the 1980s), because there was no bipartisan solution.
46
 
 With so much contention, why did habeas reform ultimately yield a 
super-override?  It hurdled the bipartisanship barrier.  Major public events 
can push an item over the agenda threshold to “must pass” category.  By 
“must pass” I mean a bill that has an effect upon members’ electoral future.  
In the habeas case, it took the Oklahoma City Bombing to yield a super-
override statute.
47
  Why?  Because of the implications of habeas for 
terrorists subject to the death penalty.  These implications had electoral 
consequences.  The question to the public would be whether the legislator 
coddled terrorists.  Once the electorate was perceived as imposing bipartisan 
costs at the next election,, the legislators cobbled together an override bill 
that few lawyers might have recommended—by pasting republican and 
democratic bills together, yielding what many statutory interpreters term a 
mess, but a mess capable of hurdling the bipartisanship barrier.
48
 
 If I am correct, then a rather parsimonious matrix can, in theory at least 
(it is subject to empirical verification), increase the likelihood of an override, 
 
43. Id. at 1371–72. 
44. Violent Crime Control Act of 1991: Hearing on S. 618 and S. 635 Before the S. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 14 (1991) (statement of Hon. Richard L. Thornburgh, Att’y Gen. of the 
United States). 
45. See, e.g. 137 CONG. REC. S18,235 (July 15, 1991) (statement of Sen. Spector) (discussing 
habeas corpus reform). 
46. See Charles Doyle, Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996: A Summary 
(June 3, 1996), http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/96-499.htm (stating that the Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act of 1996 is the product of legislative efforts stretching back well over a decade). 
47. See CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 96-499A, ANTITERRORISM AND 
EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT OF 1996: A SUMMARY (1996), available at 
http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/96-499.htm (stating that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act of 1996 was passed in response to the Oklahoma City bombing) 
48. Larry Yackle describes this in a lengthy article. Larry W. Yackle, A Primer on the New 
Habeas Corpus Statute, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 381 (1996). 
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the likelihood of no override, and the likelihood that a bill will move from 
one category to another.  I hope that, in future work, students of overrides 
will take the extraordinary cornucopia of information provided in the 
Christiansen and Eskridge super-override study to test this hypothesis. 
III. Normative Implications 
 Christiansen and Eskridge conclude their study with a variety of 
normative recommendations largely sympathetic to overrides.
49
  They, like 
others before them, find a court–congress dialogue something to be 
encouraged.
50
  They argue that overrides serve a number of values, including 
the rule of law and democratic transparency.
51
  The last fourth of the article 
is a lengthy exegesis of the virtues of overrides as a part of our system of 
government.
52
  Of particular interest are their conclusions as they apply to 
the “triadic” relationship to agencies, which turn out to be big winners here.  
I leave it to the readers to determine whether in fact they agree with these 
normative claims about the virtues of overrides.  I would simply caution 
scholars to remember the transaction costs of the override enterprise and the 
relative size of the institutions.  We are talking about the Supreme Court, 
with 9 Justices, 36 clerks, and maybe a few hundred employees, against 535 
members and 30,000 staffers, representing 300 million people.  Whose time 
do we want to waste on matters that Christiansen and Eskridge acknowledge 
are not the major political issues of our time?  Overrides can be enormously 
costly, requiring decades of efforts to achieve the agreement of 535 members 
and the President.  This is time taken away from war, poverty, budgets 
monetary policy, and climate change in the greatest free nation on earth. 
 Christiansen and Eskridge are correct, in my view, to begin to imagine a 
way in which the vast bulk of the quotidian overrides (and they themselves 
suggest the vast majority of overrides are quotidian from a political 
perspective) can be accomplished more easily.  They propose a variety of 
institutional solutions.  My response is this:  any real solution will require 
an institution that can put the issue on the agenda, and force a bipartisan 
solution.  It is not a matter for technocrats inside any department (e.g. the 
Justice Department) or within the Congress (e.g. professional legislation 
drafters).  The only way out of override politics is through it, which will 
require an institution with significant stature and political background to 
respond to Congress’s institutional realities—to force an issue on the 
override agenda, and cobble together a bipartisan group to pass the override. 
 
49. Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 2, at 1439–79. 
50. Id. at 1439–40. 
51. Id. at 1464–65. 
52. Id. at 1439–79 
